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Abstract 
What is the relationship between bank fragility and competition during a period of market 
turmoil? Does market power in European banking involve extra-gains after discounting for 
the cost of government intervention? We answer these questions in the context of Eurozone 
banking over 2005-2012 and show that greater  market power increases bank stability  
implying  aggregate extra-gains of 57% of EU12 gross domestic product  for the banking 
sector after discounting for the costs  associated with government intervention. The negative 
influence of competition on bank stability is non-monotonic and reverses for lower degrees 
of competition. Capital injections, guarantees and asset relief measures elicit greater bank 
soundness. 
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2 
1 Introduction 
The response to the global financial crisis by governments and central banks was significant 
and unprecedented in both Europe and the US. Policy measures enacted ranged from 
initiatives dealing with impaired bank assets, the recapitalizing and/or financial restructuring 
of troubled banks, and various actions designed to inject liquidity into the banking system.1 
Between the start of 2008 and October 2014 European Union (EU) governments approved 
state aid to banking systems amounting to 45.8% of GDP comprising €1.49 trillion of 
capitalization and asset relief programs and €4.3 trillion of guarantees and liquidity measures. 
Most state authorized aid was in the form of guarantees, some €3.9 trillion in total (most of 
which was granted at the peak of the crisis during 2008).2  The scale of government aid 
provided to the financial sector has prompted concerns about anti-trust implications (White, 
2009; Carletti and Vives, 2009; Beck et al., 2010; and CEPS, 2010) and also led some to 
investigate whether competitively disadvantaged banks should be subsidized (Lyons and Zhu, 
2013).                
Given anti-trust concerns relating to the state support to banks, the main aim of this paper 
is to empirically analyse the effect of state-aid on competition as well as bank stability. To 
investigate the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and government intervention on 
competition and risk we analyse separate banking markets and control for a range of factors 
including systemic heterogeneity, bank-level fundamentals and macroeconomic features. We 
                                                 
1 See BIS (2009), Group of Thirty (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009) for detailed perspectives on the causes and 
consequences of the global financial crisis. For European insights see De Larosière (2009) and Goddard et al. 
(2009). 
2
 Information from the EC State Aid to the banking sector scoreboard: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html.  
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compute various indicators (at the bank level) capturing overall stability, credit risk and 
liquidity risk. Competition is estimated using the Lerner Index (Calderon and Schaeck, 2015) 
which enables us to derive measures at the bank level and over time. Additionally, we include 
variables to capture different forms of government intervention, business models and the 
degree of market power. Using various panel techniques we test whether changes in 
competition are associated to variations in bank risk. We also investigate the impact of the 
crisis period (2008-2012) and the effect of government intervention on individual bank 
stability measured using the Z-index. In addition, we estimate the net pecuniary cost/gain of 
government intervention in the banking sector calculated on a countrywide basis as the 
difference between aggregate extra-profits associated with enhanced market power and the 
cost of government intervention computed as expenditures to gross domestic product 
(Maudos and de Guevara, 2007). To address the usual endogeneity concerns of competition 
in our baseline regressions and in-line with previous studies (Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et 
al., 2014; Kick and Prieto, 2014), we employ instrumental variable estimation methods.  
We show that market power increases bank stability (consistent with  previous literature, 
including  Beck et al. (2013) and Fu et al. (2014)) and this results in a net pecuniary gain 
(enhanced banking sector profits resulting from increases in market power that exceed the 
cost of government intervention). This finding is important for policy makers as it highlights 
the benefits as well as the costs of public support to the banking industry at times of crises. 
We also show that the positive effect of market power on bank stability is non-monotonic 
and reverses for high levels of market power. Bank specialization is also found to be 
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significantly and positively related to individual bank stability, namely, that capital injections, 
guarantees and asset relief measures increase individual bank soundness.3  
Our paper bridges two strands of the literature: the first investigates the link between 
competition and stability/fragility in banking; the second examines policy intervention post-
global financial crisis. The first strand of literature evaluates the link between competition 
and bank fragility with a well-established theoretical debate hinging on the trade-off between 
competition and stability (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). Allen 
and Gale (2004) underline the complexity of this relationship pointing out that though there 
are benefits from static efficiency, competition can lead to greater instability. Heightened 
competition, however, can reduce the “charter value” of banks causing instability in the 
financial system (Allen and Gale, 2004). The empirical evidence on the link between 
competition and stability is somewhat mixed and largely dependent on the sample, estimation 
methodology and choice of conditioning variables used (Beck et al., 2013). Schaeck et al. 
(2009) and Anginer et al. (2014) find that competition is positively related to systemic 
stability but Beck et al. (2006), Fu et al. (2014) and Diallo (2015) argue that more 
concentrated banking systems show a lower probability of systemic crises and greater 
resilience to such events compared with  competitive systems. Berger et al. (2009) observe 
that, even if an increase in bank market power leads to riskier portfolios, the effect on stability 
could be offset by enhanced bank franchise values. Forssbæck and Shehzad (2014) analyse 
                                                 
3  Although it would be interesting to investigate if various policy interventions produce a differential impact 
on market power in the long term, it is problematic to safely assess causality due to severe endogeneity issues. 
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competition and stability in the deposit and loan market separately and show that in both 
markets competition is positively linked to greater default and asset risk.   
The second strand of literature focuses on the impact of policy interventions during 
and post-crisis. McAndrews et al. (2008) examine the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) in mitigating liquidity problems in the interbank funding 
market and show that TAF was effective in reducing distress in money markets from 
December 2007 through April 2008. Baba and Packer (2009) analyse the effect of swap lines 
among central banks in reducing dollar shortages in the period prior to and after Lehman 
Brothers failure in September 2008. The authors find that the European Central Bank, Swiss 
National Bank and Bank of England were successful in ameliorating the problem of dollar 
funding for non-US financial institutions. Meaning and Zhu (2011) show a significant 
decrease in government bond yields following the purchases of Treasury securities by the 
Federal Reserve and of gilts by the Bank of England. A more recent study by Pennathur et 
al. (2014) examine the market reaction to nine U.S. government interventions in response to 
the crisis for different categories of financial institutions (banks, savings and loan 
associations, insurance companies, an real estate investment trusts). The authors find that 
these measures generally result in an increase in risk and a reduction in firm value. Aït-
Sahalia et al. (2012) find that policy announcements, such as fiscal and monetary policy, 
liquidity support, financial sector policy, and ad-hoc bank failures, are usually associated 
with reductions in the LIBOR–OIS spreads between June 2007 and March 2009. Fiordelisi 
and Ricci (2015) investigate the impact of policy announcements (fiscal and monetary policy, 
liquidity support, financial sector policy, and ad-hoc bank failures) on the stock price of 
globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) between June 2007 and June 2012. Typically, 
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monetary policy interventions (whether restrictive or expansionary) have a positive impact 
on bank stock returns. In contrast, bank failures and bail-outs generate strong negative returns, 
although this effect is mitigated for various G-SIBs4 providing evidence of a “too-big-too fail” 
perception by investors. G-SIBs are not found to be equally responsive to all global policy 
interventions, but appear to be more sensitive to those announced in their own currency area. 
While there is a growing literature on policy actions and bank/financial market behaviour 
post-financial crises, the  impact of  government intervention on banking sector competition 
and the potential net benefits of such actions have (as far as we are aware) yet to be addressed. 
Specifically, there is no evidence of the effect of Government aid during the crisis on 
individual bank stability and whether potential benefits relating to greater market power 
offset the cost of government intervention. 
Our study aims to make a significant contribution by focusing on the widespread state 
intervention in Europe while we account for heterogeneity in the intensity of interventions 
made by each Government and compare this against outcomes generated by the competitive 
banking environment of each country. Second, we advance previous research because we 
explicitly estimate the net pecuniary cost/gain of government interventions. Specifically, we 
propose an objective function where we compare the pecuniary gains from market power 
with the expense for stabilizing each country financial sector. A net pecuniary gain indicates 
                                                 
4 Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) are banks classified by the Financial Stability Board in the 
highest buckets of systemic relevance according to an indicator-based measurement approach reflecting size, 
level of interconnectedness, substitutability, global activity and complexity of a credit institution. 
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that competition could be hastened as it would not increase the cost of government 
intervention.5  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we describe the data and 
variables (section 2), and the empirical design (section 3). Next, we present our results 
(section 4) and robustness checks (section 5). Conclusions are summarized in section 6. 
 
2 Data and variables 
In this section, we outline our data collection process (section 2.1), the estimation process of 
the variables used to capture competition (section 2.2), bank risk-taking (section 2.3), 
government aid (section 2.4) and other economic phenomenon that may alter the 
relationships investigated (section 2.5). 
2.1 Data 
We analyse banks operating in the twelve countries that adopted the euro on the 1st January 
2002. Bank financial statements are taken from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database. The 
data span the years 2005 through 2012. 6  We select all types of depository institutions 
(commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks) and only use unconsolidated data. 
After data cleansing, our final sample consists of around 19,100 observations for 2,621 
individual banks distributed in the twelve countries. 7 In 2012, the median total assets of the 
                                                 
5 In the case of a net pecuniary cost government should contribute additional resources to cover for the overall 
lack of profitability of the domestic banking sector. 
6 International Accounting Standards (IAS) were introduced across Europe in 2005, causing the dataset before 
and after 2005 to differ.   
7 In terms of number, cooperative banks are the most represented (61%), followed by savings banks (25%) and 
commercial banks (14%) 
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banks included in the sample are approximately Euro 680 million and only five banks have 
assets larger than Euro 100 billion. Looking at the distribution of banks over time per country, 
we notice that six countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain) 
represent 98% of the sample. In 2012, the Netherlands is the country with the largest banks 
(with average assets size of Euro 63 billion) and Finland the lowest (Euro 650 million). The 
distributions of banks by year-specialization and by year-country are reported in Table 1. 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 1 > 
Additional information on country-level data is retrieved from Eurostat, the World Bank, 
the European Commission and the European Central Bank. The justification for the choice 
of these variables is provided in section 2.5 describing other variables. All the variables 
constructed with accounting information are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile level of 
their distribution to mitigate the impact of outliers. 
2.2 Measuring competition: the Lerner Index  
We estimate a non-structural measure of competition using the Lerner Index (LER) to 
derive individual bank’s monopoly power. This indicator represents the extent to which firms 
fix prices above marginal cost,   it is computed as follows: 
  ( 1 ) 
where the subscript i indicates each individual bank and t each individual year; P is the price 
of the output and MC is the marginal cost. Higher values of the index imply greater market 
power.  
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The price of output P is calculated as total revenues (interest plus non-interest income) 
divided by total assets. For the estimation of marginal cost, we follow the intermediation 
approach where bank output is modelled as a stock identified by total assets, and inputs are 
deposits, labour and physical capital.  Following some recent studies (Anginer et al., 2014; 
Beck et al., 2013), we estimate a pooled OLS regression to derive marginal costs using a 
translog cost function with three inputs and one single output. We also include binary 
variables indicating bank’s specialization to account for potential differences in business 
model (namely, commercial, savings and cooperative banks), the cost of borrowing and the 
nominal value of labour cost index for financial and insurance activities (to control for cross-
country heterogeneity) and time fixed effects to capture technical change (year dummy 
variables). The final specification is as follows: 
  
( 2 ) 
where  subscripts i, c and t indicate  individual banks,  countries and  years, respectively; TC 
is total costs (the sum of personnel expenses, other administrative expenses and other 
operating expenses); Q is the banks’ single output proxied by total assets; wj are the price of  
inputs employed in the production process: wL is the price of labour ( personnel expenses 
over total assets), wK is the price of physical capital (i.e., other operating expenses over total 
assets), wD is the price of deposits ( interest expenses over the sum of total deposits and 
money market funds). BankSpec and Year are the dichotomous variables for bank 
specialization and for each individual year respectively. Macro are macroeconomic variables 
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at the country level;  are robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank level. A 
pooled OLS regression is used considering all 12 countries over 2005-2012. In addition, we 
impose the common restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in input prices.8 
From equation (2), marginal costs can be derived as follows: 
  ( 3 ) 
Table 2 reports the time-series development of the average Lerner index per country per 
year. The estimates are in-line with previous studies in terms of trends and magnitude (Buch 
et al., 2012; Kick and Prieto, 2014; Clerides et al., 2015). Over the period 2005-2012, Austria, 
Greece, and Spain are the only countries that see a substantial fall in market power. Austria 
and Spain witness an increase in marginal cost and a coincident decline in the average price 
charged to customers, while in Greece, although average prices have increased, marginal 
costs have risen faster. In contrast, in Ireland and Portugal (countries that both experienced 
substantial banking sector turmoil) we observe an increase in market power. In Ireland, price 
increased more than marginal cost; in Portugal, both price and marginal costs declined but 
the latter fell faster. Overall, bank marginal costs have fallen in all countries except for 
Austria, Greece, Ireland and Spain; prices also generally declined apart from in Greece, 
Finland and Ireland.   
< INSERT HERE TABLE 2 > 
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To cross-check the reliability of the Lerner estimates, we estimate the Lerner Index for 
EU8 countries with at least 80 observations over the period 2005-2012, 9 and compute a 
separate estimation for EU8 countries over the period 2007-2012 to investigate the dynamics 
during the crisis period (2008-2012).  We also compute an adjusted-Lerner index for credit 
risk exposure. Namely, we deduct loan impairment charges from total revenues to account 
for the exposure to credit risk. As further tests of robustness we estimate the efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index employed in recent papers (Koetter et al., 2012; Buch et al., 2013). 
Finally, as in Beck et al. (2013) and Anginer et al. (2014), we employ an instrumental variable 
approach to deal with potential endogeneity issues associated with estimating the Lerner 
index.  
 
2.3 Measuring bank risk exposures  
We employ multiple measures of bank stability. Our main variable of interest is the 
overall bank risk of failure computed as the natural logarithm of the Z-Index (Buch et al., 
2012; Beck et al., 2013; Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2014). The Z-Index is calculated at the 
bank level as follows: 
  ( 4 ) 
where subscript i indicates individual banks, T the current period and t= {1...T}; ROA is 
the return on assets; E/A denotes the equity to total assets ratio; σ(ROA) is the standard 
                                                 
9 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. 
, , ,
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deviation of return on assets for bank i using a rolling time window.10 The Z-Index provides 
a measure of bank soundness because it indicates the number of standard deviations by which 
returns have to diminish in order to deplete the equity of a bank. A higher Z-Index implies a 
higher degree of solvency and therefore it gives a direct measure of bank financial stability. 
We also use the natural logarithm of the Z-index to smooth out higher values of the 
distribution (Table 3).  
< INSERT HERE TABLE 3 > 
We also include other risk measures employed in the literature.  The liquidity risk 
measure is constructed as cash and due from banks on total short-term funding. It gives an 
indication on resources quickly available to cover cash outflows (Gropp et al., 2011). The 
ratio of loan-loss provisions over total loans provides information on the exposure to credit 
risk (Jiménez et al., 2013; Kick and Prieto, 2014). The coverage ratio indicates the level of 
solvency of a bank in terms of available capital compared to non-standard loans. It is 
constructed as the sum of equity and loan reserves minus non-performing loans, all divided 
by total assets.  
2.4 Measuring government intervention 
A number of variables are used to account for the crisis period and government intervention. 
We first include in the analysis a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the years 2008 
                                                 
10  The method employed for the estimation of the standard deviation of return on assets may create 
autocorrelation. We therefore compute the autocorrelation of the Z-Index at different lags and find that the 
autocorrelation coefficients show a moderate level of autocorrelation (highest figure is 0.393 for the first lag). 
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through 2012, 0 otherwise and following Laeven and Valencia (2013) the beginning of the 
GFC is set as 2008. 11  Moreover, our analysis covers the effects of individual measures 
undertaken by different governments to safeguard and support troubled banks including 
capital injections, guarantees, asset relief interventions and liquidity measures using data 
provided by the European Commission. To avoid comparison problems, we measure the   
cost of intervention as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Individual 
government intervention measures are interacted with two dummy variables expressing bank 
specialization to investigate whether banks with different business models benefited more/or 
less from various types of  state intervention. Moreover, in order to investigate the combined 
effect of high market power and government intervention over the period 2008-2012, a 
dummy variable is constructed using the highest decile of the Lerner distribution per year-
country in the EU8 countries. In this case, the Lerner index is estimated following Equation 
(1) for EU8 countries only over the period 2007-2012.12 The combined effects are explored 
through the interaction between the government intervention and either this dummy variable 
or the Lerner index. Table 4 reports the information on the magnitude of the different forms 
of public intervention to support financial institutions as a percentage of GDP. 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 4 > 
                                                 
11 Laeven and Valencia (2013) do not include Finland within the group of countries that experienced a systemic 
banking crisis in the period 2007-2011. Nevertheless, we postulate that the period 2008-2012 is systematically 
different at the European level compared to the previous time period. 
12 To be more specific, the marginal cost is estimated using Equations (2) and (3) for EU8 countries only over 
the period 2007-2012. 
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Following Maudos and De Guevara (2007), we estimate a measure of the pecuniary 
cost/gain of market power in banking. Given that there could be a positive impact of market 
power for individual bank stability, we posit that the cost of government intervention may be 
offset by aggregate price mark-ups for various banks or across banking systems. We therefore 
calculate the following: 
 ( 5 ) 
where  subscript i, c and t indicate  individual banks,  countries and  years, respectively; 
GDP  is the gross domestic product in a country in a year; n is the total number of individual 
banks in a country in a year; P is the price of output for each individual bank computed as 
total revenues over total assets; MC is the Marginal Cost for the individual bank computed 
as per expression (3); Q is the bank single output ( total assets); CostOfGov is the total 
expenditure in millions of euros born by a specific country in a year. Equation (5) summarises 
the net pecuniary costs/gains that arise due to market power changes at banks compared with 
the cost of government intervention. Using Equation (5) we are able first to estimate the 
resources left on the table for the banking sector due to market power. We then compute the 
net pecuniary gain after discounting the cost of government intervention. A negative value 
indicates that it is likely that government expenditures are higher in the case of state bailout. 
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2.5 Other variables 
An additional set of variables are considered to investigate the potential effects of the 
influence of other determinants on the relationship between competition and risk, such as 
bank-level fundamentals, systemic heterogeneity and environmental determinants. 
The bank level-fundamentals relate to financial leverage and size. We endogenise the 
decision on the level of financial leverage as the liability structure has a crucial effect on the 
relationship between insolvency risk and banking market power (Freixas and Ma, 2014). The 
ratio is built as total liabilities to total equity. The size variable is computed as the natural 
logarithm of bank total assets.  
As in Beck et al. (2013), a ‘herding’ measure is built as the within country standard 
deviation per year of non-interest income as a share of total assets.  It takes into consideration 
the possible incentives for banks to increase their risk-taking following an increase in 
competition. The higher the value the more heterogeneous the sources of bank revenue 
(namely, less herding). In addition, we control for the influence of the macroeconomic 
environment using the GDP growth rate and the total long term unemployment rate (Jimenez 
et al, 2013; Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2014). The complete list of variables, data sources and 
definitions appear in Table 5. 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 5 > 
Table 6 reports the summary descriptive statistics of the sample and the correlation 
matrix for the relevant variables only. The Lerner index takes on negative values when 
marginal costs are higher than average prices, whilst the other variables are positively defined. 
The Z-index shows a highly right-skewed distribution therefore supporting our decision to 
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take   the natural logarithm to smooth the data. It is also worth noting that there exists low 
correlation between all the pairs of variables.  
< INSERT HERE TABLE 6 > 
 
3 Identification strategy 
Following a standard approach adopted in papers linking bank-fragility and competition 
(Gropp et al., 2011; Anginer et al., 2014; Forssbæck et al., 2014), we model bank risk taking 
as a function of bank-, industry- and country- level determinants as described below: 
  ( 6 ) 
where the subscripts i, c, t denote individual bank, country and time dimensions respectively; 
Risk is a bank risk-taking variable; COMP refers to banking competition; X are variables of 
interest to test our additional assumptions (namely the financial crisis period, bank’s 
specialization and market power); GOV relates to various types of government intervention; 
K are controls for bank-level fundamentals; and M are controls for macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Our identification strategy involves three steps. First, we analyse the relationship among 
a set of risk measures, market power and a dichotomous variable for the crisis period (taking 
the value of 1 between 2008 and 2012, 0 otherwise) over the period 2005-2012. Specifically, 
we analyse the extent of the relationship between financial stability, competition and the 
crisis period by using the following panel fixed-effects model, in line with the methodology 
adopted by Forssbæck et al. (2014): 
, , , , , , ,( , , , , )i t i t i c t c t i t c tRisk f Comp X Gov K M
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( 7 ) 
 
where Risk are different risk measures ( the natural logarithm of the Z-index; liquidity risk; 
credit risk; and the coverage ratio); COMP is the competition indicator  measured using the 
Lerner index; Crisis is the dummy variable for the crisis period; K are  controls for  bank-
level fundamentals ( financial leverage and bank asset size). M are controls for 
macroeconomic conditions (herding measure, GDP growth and the long-term unemployment 
rate). αi is the time invariant component of the error. ε indicates robust standard errors 
clustered at the individual bank level. β, δ and φ are parameters to be estimated. All the 
regressors are lagged one-year to lessen any simultaneity problems. We estimate the 
parameters of interest using a within-fixed effects estimator that allows the regressors to be 
correlated with αi. The explanatory variables are calculated over the period 2004-2011 to 
allow for estimation of the lagged relationship. We also run the Hausman's specification test 
to verify whether the random effects model provides more efficient estimates compared to 
the fixed effects model. 
The second stage of our analysis focuses only on the crisis period (2008-2012) by 
considering whether government intervention had a differential impact of various bank types 
(commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks). Similar to Beck et al. (2013) and 
Anginer et al. (2014), we use a pooled OLS model to allow for the introduction of time-
invariant variables and specifically bank specialization. Country dummy variables are 
included to avoid biases caused by omitted country-specific regressors while time 
dichotomous variables account for time specific effects. The model specification is as follows: 
2
2 3
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( 8 ) 
 
where Risk is the natural logarithm of the Z-index; COMP is the Lerner index; BankSpec are 
two dichotomous variables for bank specialization; GovInt indicate the four forms of 
government intervention: capital injections, guarantees, asset relief and liquidity provision. 
K are controls for bank-level fundamentals; γ are time fixed effects; θ are country fixed 
effects; ε indicates the robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank level. α, β, ω, 
λ, ζ, δ are parameters to be estimated. In the pooled OLS framework, the error term is 
uncorrelated with explanatory variables. These are calculated over the period 2007-2011 to 
allow for the estimation of lagged relationships. 
 The third stage of our analysis focuses on competition by analysing whether banks 
with the highest market power have benefited more from government intervention. In view 
of the theoretical predictions of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we include a dummy 
variable for banks with the highest market power in a specific country in a specific year to 
investigate the possibility of non-linearity between competition to bank stability. The pooled-
OLS model specification is as follows: 
 
( 9 ) 
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where Risk is the natural logarithm of the Z-index; COMP is the Lerner index;  HighMP is a 
dummy variable for the banks with the highest market power; GovInt are the four forms of 
government intervention; K are  controls for  bank-level fundamentals; γ are time fixed effects; 
θ are country fixed effects; ε indicates  robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank 
level; α, β, λ, ζ, δ are parameters to be estimated. The explanatory variables are calculated 
for EU8 countries over the period 2007-2012 to allow for the estimation of the lagged 
relationship. 
 
4 Results  
Using panel fixed effects and pooled OLS models we investigate the relationship between 
individual bank stability, competition and government intervention. First, we relate a set of 
risk measures to the Lerner index and a dummy variable for the crisis period. We then 
introduce government intervention and bank’s specialization. We further explore whether 
banks with the highest market power have benefited more from the support of national 
governments and estimate the country net pecuniary gain/loss. 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 7 > 
Table 7 shows the results of our base regressions. Market power is positively associated 
with bank stability (Z-score and the coverage ratio) and negatively linked to  liquidity  and 
credit risk exposures. This finding is of particular interest to regulators and policy makers in 
the light of the unprecedented government intervention witnessed in Europe during the 
financial crisis. Competition is associated with higher liquidity risk: when the mark-up over 
marginal cost is higher, the opportunity-cost of liquid assets is also higher. In contrast with 
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the theoretical predictions of Boyd and de Nicolò (2005) and in-line with earlier empirical 
work (Demsetz et al., 1996; Salas and Saurina, 2003), we find that higher market power is 
associated with lower levels of provisioning and higher coverage ratios for non-performing 
loans. As expected, over the crisis period, banks  experienced an increase in their overall risk 
of insolvency compared to the previous period (2005-2007) as denoted by the negative value 
in the dummy variable for the crisis (Table 7, Column 1). There is also a fall in the level of 
provisioning and the liquidity positions of banks. 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 8 > 
 
In the second step, we turn to bank specialization and measures of the impact of 
government intervention (Table 8). Between 2008 and 2012 cooperative and savings banks 
are relatively safer compared to commercial banks and asset relief has been effective in 
shoring up individual bank stability. The estimations provide other interesting results. First, 
we find negative statistical significance for liquidity measures (Column 5, Table 8). This 
suggests that liquidity injections do not improve overall solvency problems. Second, only 
savings banks appear to benefit from enhanced stability due to the extension of guarantees 
whereas evidence is inconclusive for cooperative banks and all banks in general. Asset relief 
measures overall have a positive effect on individual bank stability and for savings and 
cooperative banks the impact was higher, while for commercial banks asset relief appears to 
increase fragility.  
< INSERT HERE TABLE 9 > 
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Results from the estimation including a dummy variable for banks with the highest 
market power show consistently greater risks (Table 9). Across all the estimations we find a 
negative sign for the coefficient of the high market power variable and strong statistical 
significance. Recapitalisation measures, guarantees and asset relief measures are all 
positively and generally significantly related to bank stability. Moreover, liquidity aid is 
negatively associated to overall bank solvency. Nonetheless, when we consider the combined 
effect with market power (Table 9, Column 4 and 9), the effect is positive suggesting that 
government intervention through liquidity provision should be targeted at banks with greater 
market power. 
To confirm the non-monotonic relationship existing between market power and 
individual bank stability, we use quantile regression to discern the conditional value of 
individual bank stability given bank market power. Results reported in Table 10 show that 
the conditional quantile treatment effects of market power on stability are statistically 
significant and positive up to the 6th decile; it then turns statistically insignificant for the 7th 
decile and switches sign for the highest Z-index deciles. 13 These findings, together with the 
results in Table 9, have important policy implications because they implicitly recognize that 
market power is beneficial for bank stability up to a point – namely up until the sixth decile 
(value of the Z-Index between 95 and 140) of the Z-index distribution.  
< INSERT HERE TABLE 10 > 
                                                 
13 We turn to the distribution of the Z-index as we are interested in the threshold value that it would be difficult 
to discern using the logarithmic transformation. Nevertheless, we run the same analysis using the natural 
logarithm of the Z-Index and the results, available upon request from the authors, remain qualitatively the same. 
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We compute the net pecuniary cost/gains using Equation (5) and the results show that 
over the period 2008-2012 in all the countries banks enjoy a positive aggregate mark-up 
(Table 11, Panel A). When we account for the cost of bailing-out the banking sector, 
countries such as Ireland and Greece experience a negative cost/gain in some years meaning 
that the surplus associated with enhanced  market power are outweighed by the cost of 
government interventions (Table 11, Panel B). This is true also if we consider the cumulative 
differential over the period 2008- 2012). 14 
< INSERT HERE TABLE 11 > 
We also perform various robustness checks.15 First we investigate whether Equations (7-9) 
are subject to misspecification or measurement errors.  An unbalanced panel data sample 
may suffer from survivorship bias and so we estimate Equations (7-9) using two different 
samples: a balanced sample with all the banks with all observations per year and a second 
sample with banks that survived until 2012 only. This allows us to rule out the alternative 
that only the safest banks survived or that government intervention is effective as we are 
considering only institutions that survived. Moreover, because Germany is the most 
represented country in terms of the number of banks in the sample (62%) and recent literature 
has shown a positive relationship between risk and competition in German banking (Buch et 
                                                 
14  The gains associated with increases in market power are likely to be understated in our analysis due to the 
low number of sample banks in some countries. Second, since government intervention is often at a point in 
time (contingent and not protracted over time), gains from market power are garnered over time, an accurate 
measurement of the trade-off should take into consideration at least the time window between two subsequent 
banking crises.  
15 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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al., 2013), the results may be driven by German data. We therefore estimate the Lerner index 
by excluding German banks and obtain the results for Equations (7-9) using this sub-sample. 
We also consider alternative approaches to compute the Lerner and the Z-indexes. We 
follow the approach proposed by Koetter et al. (2012) and compute a Lerner index adjusted 
for efficiency scores. In addition, we also estimate an adjusted Lerner index to account for 
the credit risk exposure of each individual bank. As noted in Forssbæck and Shehzad (2014) 
for lending rates, asset quality is not reflected in the calculation of the average price of the 
output therefore the risk premium is not considered in the computation of the market power. 
We therefore estimate Equation (1) by subtracting from the numerator credit provisions. 
Finally, we compute the Z-index following Yeyati and Micco (2007) where in Equation (4) 
average ROA16 is substituted for current ROA.  
The results of the robustness checks support our previous findings providing stronger 
evidence for the relationship among bank soundness, competition, market turmoil and 
government intervention. 
 
5 Controlling for Endogeneity 
We control for endogeneity concerns arising from reverse causality. In the context of the 
research design used in this paper, we argue that it is not reasonable to assume a feedback 
effect going from risk-taking to competition. This is because competition estimates predate 
banks’ risk-taking for years: it is rational to expect that banks’ can control and fix their own 
                                                 
16 The average ROA is computed using all the available information up to the current period, i.e. t= {1…T}. 
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asset allocation decisions (so their risk exposure) based on various factors, including the 
degree of competition in the industry experienced in the past.  
Endogeneity arising from omitted variables, however, could be a problem. We argue that 
this may potentiality exist, despite including a number of control variables in our main 
regressions and, especially, firm-fixed effects (Equation 7). As such, we employ an 
instrumental variable approach using the GMM estimator to address potential endogeneity 
problems. Following Anginer et al. (2014) and Beck et al. (2013), we use three different 
instruments. First, we instrument competition by using the two-year lagged Lerner Index.  
Second, we use one year lagged credit growth because the lagged year-on-year growth in net 
loans is likely to be correlated to competitive conditions but not to current risk-taking 
decisions. Third we employ the cost-income ratio in a typical setting where bank 
concentration, hence competition, is endogenously driven by bank efficiency (Demsetz, 
1973; Peltzman, 1977) but does not obviously relate to risk decisions.   
< INSERT HERE TABLE 12 > 
We report in Table 12 the results from the first and the second stage regressions when 
all the instruments are concurrently used in the first-stage regression. 17 Columns (1), (3), (5), 
(7), (9), and (11) report the results from the first-stage estimations, whilst columns (2), (4), 
(6), (8), (10) and (12) the estimations from the second stage regression. Overall, the results 
lend support to our major findings regarding the effects of competition and government aid 
on bank fragility. 
                                                 
17 In our estimation approach, we first test in the case of exactly identified Lerner index and then test the results 
in case of overidentified Lerner index. We report in Table 12 the estimations for the latter, those from the former 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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6 Conclusions  
Understanding the competition-stability nexus is important in terms of gauging the resilience 
of banking sectors. This is particularly true at times of crisis when tax-payers money is used 
to rescue and stabilise distressed credit institutions.  
We investigate the extent of the relationship between market power and stability in 
Eurozone countries (EU12) over the period 2005-2012 and find a positive relationship 
between market power and financial stability (up to a certain level of market power) and also 
that bank’s specialization is significantly related to individual bank stability. Capital 
injections, guarantees and asset relief measures increase individual bank soundness. 
Liquidity measures appear to decrease bank stability but this effect is reversed when liquidity 
aid is combined with market power.  
We compute an adjusted gain/loss function where we explicitly compare the cost of 
bailouts against the systemic gains associated with increased price-marginal cost makups 
(higher market power). We advocate that a cost-benefit approach to gauge the impact of state 
intervention in the banking sector should take into account the extra-profits associated with 
increased market power as well as the cost of government intervention. High market power 
may be justified if it is associated with extra-capital buffers to absorb systemic shocks. The 
gains from increased market power may lower or compensate for the expenditures of 
government intervention. The policy target should be close or around zero to allow for a 
safety buffer in case of systemic banking crises. We find that this is not the case for all EU12 
countries where the mark-up is positive over the crisis period (except for Greece and Ireland). 
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Our results have various limitations that are meaningful starting points for future 
research. First, different factors should be considered to find the right balance between 
allowing a moderate mark-up in the banking sector and the likelihood that bailouts should be 
of increased magnitude. Second, further work should consider the broader costs associated 
with banking crises as the immediate bailout expenses  are likely to understates  total societal 
costs (Boyd et al., 2005; Laeven and Valencia, 2013). Third, reductions in outputs associated 
with enhanced market power are not considered in our analysis and this could influence the 
pecuniary gains/losses associated with the crises. All the aforementioned areas are worthy of 
future investigation. 
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Table 1 
PANEL A: Distribution of banks by specialization and calendar year 
This table presents the distribution of banks by specialization and year over the sample period (2005-2012). Cooperative banks represent 
61% of the sample observations, savings banks 25% and commercial banks 14%. Source: Data from Bankscope after data cleansing. 
 
Specialization 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Commercial Banks 294 313 324 326 353 358 380 361 2,709 
Cooperative Bank 1,446 1,473 1,474 1,464 1,457 1,469 1,478 1,469 11,730 
Savings Bank 524 530 542 551 597 633 656 641 4,674 
Total 2,264 2,316 2,340 2,341 2,407 2,460 2,514 2,471 19,113 
 
 
PANEL B: Distribution of banks by country and calendar year 
This table presents the distribution of banks by country and year over the sample period (2005-2012). Note the lower frequency of the 
sample data over the period 2005-2004. Moreover, there are four countries (Finland, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands) with very few 
bank-year observations. Banks in Austria, Germany and Italy account for 89% of the sample. Source: Data from Bankscope. 
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Austria 193 205 206 192 195 198 199 192 1,580 
Belgium 19 19 17 19 20 20 19 16 149 
Finland 1 0 2 2 3 5 8 8 29 
France 89 88 90 91 88 97 106 98 747 
Germany 1,401 1,425 1,439 1,439 1,483 1,517 1,554 1,548 11,806 
Greece 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 24 
Ireland 1 1 1 1 2 4 4 3 17 
Italy 426 434 445 450 452 465 472 462 3,606 
Luxembourg 42 46 51 51 51 50 51 48 390 
Netherlands 4 4 7 7 10 11 11 12 66 
Portugal 7 10 12 13 13 14 13 13 95 
Spain 78 81 67 73 87 76 74 68 604 
Total 2,264 2,316 2,340 2,341 2,407 2,460 2,514 2,471 19,113 
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Table 2 
Time-series evolution of the Lerner Index 
This table reports the time-series development of the average Lerner Index per country per year. The last two columns summarise the 
difference between the average Lerner Index in year 2012 and reference years 2005 and 2007, respectively. *, **, and *** represent 
statistical significance in the mean values of Lerner Index in the two years at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed level, respectively. Source: Own 
calculation using data from Bankscope. 
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012-2005 2012-2007 
Austria 0.225 0.221 0.209 0.175 0.197 0.215 0.227 0.187 -0.039 ** -0.023 * 
Belgium 0.227 0.229 0.182 0.185 0.281 0.277 0.247 0.259 0.032 0.077 
Finland -0.196 . 0.170 0.093 0.287 0.256 0.241 0.246 0.442 0.076 
France 0.235 0.243 0.239 0.204 0.261 0.284 0.243 0.248 0.013 0.009 
Germany 0.193 0.230 0.179 0.170 0.210 0.248 0.250 0.241 0.049 *** 0.062 *** 
Greece 0.277 0.319 0.324 0.267 0.332 0.299 0.172 0.132 -0.145 -0.192 
Ireland 0.325 0.150 0.160 0.172 0.332 0.483 0.454 0.422 0.096 0.261 
Italy 0.217 0.256 0.251 0.221 0.220 0.198 0.229 0.287 0.070 *** 0.036 *** 
Luxembourg 0.246 0.235 0.213 0.201 0.270 0.307 0.285 0.296 0.050 0.084 ** 
Netherlands 0.172 0.131 0.117 0.172 0.204 0.361 0.244 0.236 0.063 0.119 
Portugal 0.166 0.220 0.278 0.187 0.243 0.224 0.202 0.267 0.100 -0.011 
Spain 0.295 0.301 0.288 0.254 0.283 0.215 0.202 0.185 -0.110 *** -0.102 *** 
EU12 0.206 0.237 0.202 0.185 0.218 0.238 0.243 0.246 0.039 *** 0.044 *** 
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Table 3 
Time-series evolution of the Z-Index  
This table reports the time-series development of the average Z-Index per country per year computed as the sum of the mean Return On 
Assets in a country at time t, and the mean Capital To Assets in country at time t, all divided by the standard deviation of the Return On 
Assets in a country at time t (see the World Bank Global Financial Development database for a detailed explanation of the method). The 
last two columns summarise the difference between the average Z-Index in year 2012 and reference years 2005 and 2007, respectively. In 
this case we do not run the test of difference in means because we compute the Z-Score using country-level aggregates hence we should 
compute and integrate the test for the difference in means using the elementary components. Source: Own calculation using data from 
Bankscope. 
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012-2005 2012-2007 
Austria 5.288 8.032 12.203 7.054 2.537 1.757 3.937 3.072 -2.216 -9.131 
Belgium 3.839 10.032 16.998 4.947 6.205 7.570 3.353 8.343 4.503 -8.656 
Finland -14.235 . 12.637 69.169 17.389 21.132 45.257 26.880 41.115 14.243 
France 10.010 9.078 11.644 7.457 8.902 0.970 9.038 9.391 -0.619 -2.253 
Germany 6.017 17.780 18.962 6.978 5.305 8.388 11.108 12.457 6.440 -6.505 
Greece 18.720 29.484 27.647 24.176 39.823 16.267 14.024 7.195 -11.525 -20.452 
Ireland 37.467 28.683 34.621 150.185 164.319 73.162 6.761 9.304 -28.162 -25.317 
Italy 22.081 24.175 18.049 24.186 21.395 7.791 6.459 17.132 -4.949 -0.917 
Luxembourg 7.423 3.353 3.445 9.670 5.563 12.078 7.965 11.246 3.823 7.801 
Netherlands 11.006 2.834 8.672 2.518 3.409 10.463 3.611 3.221 -7.785 -5.451 
Portugal 12.296 16.977 20.987 6.810 12.489 8.912 6.979 22.348 10.052 1.362 
Spain 15.308 4.596 26.483 18.528 5.660 10.136 32.181 3.241 -12.066 -23.242 
EU12 9.512 16.964 17.767 10.835 8.481 7.724 10.129 12.220 2.708 -5.547 
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Table 4 
Government intervention measures as percentage of national GDP  
This table reports the data on the different forms of public intervention as a percentage of national Gross Domestic Product. Source: European Commission, DG Competition, State Aid Scoreboard 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html. 
 
 Recapitalisation measures Guarantees Asset relief  Liquidity measures other than guarantees 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 1.00% 2.13% 0.21% 0.00% 0.64% 0.86% 5.58% 6.80% 5.69% 3.82% 0.00% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Belgium 4.86% 1.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.77% 2.60% 13.87% 9.29% 7.17% 12.17% 0.00% 2.29% 0.00% 0.00% 2.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Finland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
France 1.36% 0.49% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.44% 4.86% 4.74% 3.59% 2.63% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Germany 1.48% 1.37% 0.27% 0.14% 0.04% 0.75% 5.61% 5.28% 1.35% 0.38% 0.39% 1.03% 1.80% 0.00% 0.02% 0.14% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.00% 
Greece 0.00% 1.59% 0.00% 1.20% 15.97% 0.00% 0.63% 11.59% 26.17% 32.16% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 1.79% 3.00% 3.09% 1.42% 
Ireland 0.00% 6.73% 22.91% 10.55% 0.00% 97.05% 173.81% 127.49% 70.64% 51.04% 0.00% 0.00% 1.69% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.43% 
Italy 0.00% 0.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.69% 5.47% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Luxembourg 7.50% 0.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.21% 4.36% 3.41% 2.78% 4.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 0.34% 0.18% 0.12% 
Netherlands 3.04% 0.00% 0.82% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 6.31% 6.91% 5.51% 3.22% 0.00% 0.88% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.22% 5.33% 1.34% 0.62% 0.27% 
Portugal 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.08% 0.71% 3.12% 2.89% 5.00% 10.04% 0.00% 0.00% 1.80% 0.00% 0.00% 0.63% 2.23% 2.21% 1.45% 0.11% 
Spain 0.00% 0.12% 0.89% 0.79% 3.85% 0.00% 3.44% 5.25% 5.75% 6.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.27% 0.00% 2.43% 0.21% 1.84% 1.78% 1.26% 0.33% 
EU12 1.25% 1.11% 0.25% 0.13% 0.25% 0.64% 4.58% 4.55% 2.03% 2.19% 0.24% 0.67% 1.13% 0.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.11% 0.20% 0.05% 0.02% 
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Table 5 
Variables definition  
This table defines the variables included in the analysis.  
 
Variables Symbol Definition and calculation method 
Dependent variables     
Z-index ZSCORE Computed as the sum of the current period t return on assets (ROA) and the equity 
ratio (equity over total assets) divided by the standard deviation of ROA computed 
for each individual institution (i) using a  rolling time window with all the available 
information up to the current year. 
Coverage ratio CovRatio Sum of equity and loan reserves minus non-performing loans, all divided by total 
assets. 
Credit risk ratio LLPTL Loan-loss provision to total loans.  
Liquidity ratio LIQ Cash and due from other banks to short-term funding.  
Explanatory variables   
Lerner Index LER Extent to which market power allows the bank to fix a price (P) above its marginal 
cost (MC). 
High market power HighMP Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank is in the highest decile of the 
distribution of the Lerner Index in a country (c) in a year (t). The dummy variable is 
computed for countries that have more than ten observations in every year over the 
period 2007-2012. 
Crisis period CRISIS Dummy variable for the crisis period that takes value of 1 in years 2008-2012, 0 
otherwise. 
Capital injections RM Amount of government recapitalisation measures as percentage of country gross 
domestic product. 
Guarantees GUAR Amount of government guarantees measures as percentage of country gross 
domestic product. 
Asset relief  AR Amount of government asset relief measures as percentage of country gross 
domestic product. 
Liquidity provision LM Amount of government liquidity provision measures as percentage of country gross 
domestic product. 
Control variables   
Size ln_TOTA Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Financial leverage FL Total liabilities to total equity. 
Herding measure HERD This is a measure of banking industry heterogeneity computed as the within 
country standard deviation of the percentage non-interest income (with respect to 
total assets) per year (t) and per country (c). 
Macroeconomic 
indicators 
MACRO 
CONTROLS 
Set of macroeconomic indicators: annual percentage change in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP_gro); long-term unemployment (12 months and more) in millions of 
people looking for a paid job (Lt_unemp). 
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Table 6 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest included in the estimation. Panel B presents the univariate 
correlation statistics between the main variables of interest. * represents 10% statistical significance level.  
 
Variable Symbol Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median p10 p90 Min Max 
Z-Score ZSCORE 19,113 207.367 490.950 65.018 16.050 442.137 2.926 4,315.308 
Coverage ratio CovRatio 19,113 0.082 0.073 0.067 0.042 0.120 0.004 0.607 
Credit Risk LLPTL 19,113 0.006 0.011 0.006 -0.001 0.016 -0.037 0.047 
Liquidity Risk LIQ 19,113 0.048 0.050 0.040 0.009 0.084 0.000 0.403 
Lerner Index LER 19,113 0.222 0.107 0.226 0.110 0.338 -0.245 0.513 
Financial leverage FL 19,113 13.431 6.522 12.757 6.502 20.311 0.529 44.968 
Size ln_TOTA 19,113 13.361 1.442 13.314 11.579 15.208 6.105 20.996 
 
 
PANEL B: Correlation matrix of the main variables of interest 
Variable ZSCORE CovRatio LLPTL LIQ LER FL ln_TOTA 
Z-Score 1.000             
Coverage ratio -0.0342* 1.000      
Credit Risk 0.0391* 0.006 1.000     
Liquidity Risk 0.0619* 0.1194* 0.0399* 1.000    
Lerner Index -0.0360* -0.0005 0.0600* -0.1051* 1.000   
Financial leverage 0.0451* -0.5556* 0.0535* 0.0588* -0.1000* 1.000  
Size -0.0456* -0.3145* -0.0508* -0.0390* 0.3923* 0.4079* 1.000 
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Table 7 
Link between bank stability, competition and the crisis period (2008-2012) in 
Eurozone banks 
This table reports the results from the estimation of Equation (7).  We use a panel fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered 
at the individual bank level. The sample includes European banks in EU12 over the period 2005-2012. Notice that the total number of 
observations (17,874) reflects the unbalanced nature of the data set (Ti ≠ T for some banks). We report the p-value of the Hausman test 
(row Hausman test - p-value), in which the null hypothesis is that the random effects estimator is both efficient and consistent. Rho is the 
intraclass correlation; the higher the better is the fitting of the model. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
two tailed level, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES lnZ CovRatio LLPTL LIQ 
LERt-1 0.800*** 0.020* -0.006*** -0.027*** 
 (0.105) (0.011) (0.002) (0.010) 
CRISISt-1 -0.443*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.009*** 
 (0.020) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
ln_TOTAt-1 -0.405*** -0.025*** 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.050) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
FLt-1 -0.006* -0.002*** 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HERDt-1 -0.002 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP_grot-1 -0.018*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemp_allt-1 -0.023*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 10.100*** 0.457*** -0.009 0.048 
  (0.663) (0.071) (0.009) (0.032) 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,874 17,874 17,874 17,874 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
rho 0.837 0.876 0.431 0.692 
Number of banks 2,621 2,621 2,621 2,621 
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Table 8 
Link between bank stability, competition, business model and government 
intervention in Eurozone banks 
This table reports the results from the estimation of Equation (8). We use a pooled ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors clustered at the 
individual bank level. We control for country and time fixed effects. Bank controls include size and financial leverage. The sample comprises European banks 
in EU12 over the period 2008-2012. Notice that the total number of observation (11,874) reflects the unbalanced nature of the data set (Ti ≠ T for some banks). 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed level, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ 
LERt-1 1.209*** 1.185*** 1.178*** 1.196*** 1.170*** 
 (0.180) (0.181) (0.183) (0.180) (0.182) 
Cooperative 0.552*** 0.546*** 0.527*** 0.570*** 0.561*** 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.067) (0.071) (0.070) 
Savings 1.002*** 0.874*** 0.891*** 1.021*** 1.017*** 
 (0.073) (0.077) (0.071) (0.075) (0.074) 
RMt-1 0.010    0.009 
 (0.012)    (0.011) 
Cooperative_RMt-1 0.018     
 (0.021)     
Savings_RMt-1 0.031     
 (0.024)     
GUARt-1  0.003   0.006 
  (0.006)   (0.006) 
Cooperative_GUARt-1  0.004    
  (0.008)    
Savings_GUARt-1  0.052***    
  (0.009)    
ARt-1   -0.126**  0.056*** 
   (0.056)  (0.019) 
Cooperative_ARt-1   0.153**   
   (0.060)   
Savings_ARt-1   0.331***   
   (0.062)   
LMt-1    -0.043 -0.092*** 
    (0.063) (0.033) 
Cooperative_LMt-1    -0.101  
    (0.100)  
Savings_LMt-1    -0.024  
    (0.101)  
Constant 3.213*** 3.170*** 3.264*** 3.321*** 3.290*** 
  (0.222) (0.223) (0.221) (0.228) (0.224) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 
R-squared 0.288 0.290 0.291 0.288 0.288 
Number of Banks 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579 
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Table 9 
Link between bank stability, competition and government intervention in Eurozone 
banks 
This table reports the results from the estimation of Equation (9). We use a pooled ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank 
level. Equation (9) is estimated for EU8 over the period 2007-2012. We control for country and time fixed effects. Bank controls include size and financial leverage. The sample 
comprises European banks in EU8 over the period 2008-2012. Notice that the total number of observation (11,786) reflects the unbalanced nature of the data set (Ti ≠ T for 
some banks). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed level, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ 
LERt-1 1.699*** 1.666*** 1.657*** 1.679*** 1.659*** 1.263*** 1.234*** 1.245*** 1.140*** 
 (0.204) (0.206) (0.207) (0.204) (0.208) (0.194) (0.214) (0.196) (0.206) 
HighMPt-1 -0.372*** -0.354*** -0.362*** -0.392*** -0.377***     
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.058) (0.062) (0.061)     
RMt-1 0.030**    0.023** 0.032    
 (0.012)    (0.012) (0.024)    
HighMP_RMt-1 -0.016         
 (0.040)         
GUARt-1  0.023***   0.017**  0.026**   
  (0.005)   (0.007)  (0.010)   
HighMP_GUARt-1  -0.010        
  (0.012)        
ARt-1   0.067***  0.027   0.126***  
   (0.015)  (0.023)   (0.048)  
HighMP_ARt-1   -0.031       
   (0.048)       
LMt-1    -0.114*** -0.114***    -0.242*** 
    (0.043) (0.042)    (0.085) 
HighMP_LMt-1    0.222*      
    (0.129)      
Ler_RMt-1      -0.060    
      (0.099)    
Ler_GUARt-1       -0.011   
       (0.042)   
Ler_ARt-1        -0.225  
        (0.187)  
Ler_LMt-1         0.559* 
         (0.295) 
Constant 3.044*** 2.982*** 3.059*** 3.142*** 2.430*** 3.218*** 3.154*** 3.210*** 3.340*** 
  (0.203) (0.204) (0.203) (0.204) (0.306) (0.207) (0.209) (0.206) (0.208) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,786 11,786 11,786 11,786 11,786 11,786 11,786 11,785 11,786 
R-squared 0.237 0.238 0.237 0.237 0.238 0.230 0.230 0.231 0.230 
Number of Banks 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 
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Table 10 
Conditional quantile treatment effects of market power on individual bank stability 
This table presents the results of the quantile regression that expresses the quantiles of the conditional distribution of the natural logarithm of 
the Z-Index as linear functions of the Lerner Index. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed level, 
respectively. Standard errors, on the basis of 100 bootstrap replications, appear in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Z-Index q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90 
LER 25.663*** 27.386*** 30.875*** 30.381*** 34.808*** 24.234** 21.720 -66.213* -445.513*** 
 (1.226) (3.180) (3.788) (4.281) (6.925) (11.809) (17.234) (38.528) (124.589) 
Constant 10.626*** 21.091*** 30.729*** 42.793*** 57.295*** 83.101*** 124.133*** 225.502*** 546.032*** 
  (0.360) (0.781) (0.967) (1.017) (1.556) (2.690) (3.881) (8.965) (31.451) 
Observations 19,113 19,113 19,113 19,113 19,113 19,113 19,113 19,113 19,113 
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Table 11 
PANEL A: Time series development of the pecuniary cost/gain of market power in 
banking (% GDP) 
Panel A reports the time series development at country level of the cost/gain defined in Equation (5) as percentage 
of country GDP for EU12 over the period 2008-2012.  
Year Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain EU12 
2008 5.91% 2.01% 3.17% 12.66% 0.26% 2.45% 5.93% 1.08% 1.58% 2.25% 12.09% 
2009 6.05% 2.05% 3.25% 13.19% 0.26% 2.72% 6.14% 1.12% 1.61% 2.33% 12.52% 
2010 5.86% 1.96% 3.16% 12.55% 0.27% 2.79% 6.02% 1.10% 1.57% 2.34% 11.76% 
2011 5.59% 1.89% 3.06% 12.00% 0.29% 2.71% 5.91% 1.07% 1.58% 2.33% 11.25% 
2012 5.45% 1.86% 3.02% 11.74% 0.31% 2.69% 5.96% 1.07% 1.64% 2.37% 11.02% 
 
PANEL B: Time series development of the net pecuniary cost/gain of market power in 
banking (% GDP) 
Panel B reports the time series development at country level of the net pecuniary cost of market power in banking 
defined in Equation (5) as percentage of country GDP. Notice that the cumulative net pecuniary cost the period 
2008-2012 is negative for Ireland and Greece only. 
 
Year Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain EU12 
2008 5.91% 1.98% 3.17% 12.48% 0.26% 2.39% 5.93% 1.01% 1.57% 2.24% 11.97% 
2009 5.96% 1.85% 3.24% 12.95% 0.23% -0.15% 6.14% 0.31% 1.58% 2.31% 12.35% 
2010 5.17% 1.78% 3.16% 11.00% 0.23% -18.38% 6.01% 0.64% 0.22% 2.28% 10.70% 
2011 5.26% 1.55% 3.06% 11.63% 0.05% -2.54% 5.90% 0.84% 1.02% 1.81% 10.96% 
2012 4.45% 0.88% 2.89% 11.34% -4.68% 2.10% 5.95% 0.88% 0.75% -1.47% 10.55% 
2012-2008 26.76% 8.05% 15.53% 59.40% -3.91% -16.58% 29.93% 3.68% 5.13% 7.18% 56.54% 
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Table 12 
Instrumental variable regressions  
This table presents the results of the instrumental variable regression. For the sake of space, we report the results for the estimations of a limited number of specifications, specifically Column (1) in 
Table 7, Column (5) in Table 8 and Columns (6) to (9) in Table 9. Following Anginer et al. (2014) and Beck et al. (2013), we employ as instruments for the Lerner Index the two-year lagged Lerner 
index, one-year lagged loan growth and one-year lagged cost-income ratio. Results from the first-stage regression appear in Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11). The row Lert-1 reports the coefficients 
for the fitted values of the Lerner Index obtained from the first-stage regression. Results from the second-stage regression appear in Columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), and (12). Estimates are obtained 
using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank level. In Columns (6), (8), (10) and (12) the instrumented variables are the 
Lerner Index and the interactions between the Lerner Index and capital injections, guarantees, asset relief and liquidity provision, respectively. Columns (5), (7), (9) and (11) presents the first-stage 
results for the Lerner Index only. For the sake of space, we do not present the results of first-stage regressions for the interactions. The row Adjusted R-squared presents the result of the goodness-of-
fit of the instrumental variables in the first-stage regression. The higher the better are the instruments in explaining the Lerner Index. The row C (difference-in-Sargan) presents the results of the test of 
endogeneity of the instruments. Under the null hypothesis the instruments are exogenous. Robust F presents the results of the F statistic. The higher the value the better the goodness-of-fit. Hansen's J 
presents the results for Hansen's J statistic. Under the null hypothesis, the over-identifying restrictions are valid. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ 
LERt-1  0.697**  1.325***  1.322***  1.418***  1.584***  1.196*** 
  (0.309)  (0.283)  (0.247)  (0.270)  (0.239)  (0.332) 
CRISISt-1 0.009*** -0.093***           
 (0.001) (0.021)           
Cooperative   -0.003 0.616***         
   (0.004) (0.071)         
Savings   -0.002 1.010***         
   (0.003) (0.075)         
RMt-1   -0.000 0.006 0.079 -0.015       
   (0.001) (0.008) (0.053) (0.030)       
GUARt-1   0.001** 0.002   0.033* -0.003     
   (0.000) (0.003)   (0.017) (0.012)     
ARt-1   0.028*** 0.065***     0.080 0.231   
   (0.003) (0.016)     (0.065) (0.262)   
LMt-1   -0.010** -0.081**       0.140 -0.268** 
   (0.005) (0.035)       (0.094) (0.104) 
Ler_RMt-1      0.089       
      (0.146)       
Ler_GUARt-1        0.093*     
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ LERt-1 lnZ 
        (0.052)     
Ler_ARt-1          0.003   
          (0.067)   
Ler_LMt-1            0.662* 
            (0.395) 
Constant 0.034 4.146*** 0.028 3.049*** -0.017 3.070***  -0.056 3.118*** 0.005 3.224*** 0.010 3.149*** 
  (0.051) (0.222) (0.045) (0.229) (0.052) (0.211) (0.059) (0.215) (0.056) (0.207) (0.048) (0.217) 
LERt-2 0.527*** - 0.560*** - 0.567*** - 0.583*** - 0.566*** - 0.556*** - 
 (0.067) - (0.059) - (0.054) - (0.053) - (0.058) - (0.059) - 
CostIncomet-1 -0.148** - -0.118* - -0.099 - -0.075 - -0.108 - -0.113* - 
 (0.075) - (0.061) - (0.065) - (0.071) - (0.070) - (0.066) - 
LoanGrowtht-1 0.015** - 0.012 - 0.025*** - 0.018** - 0.015** - 0.005 - 
  (0.006) - (0.009) - (0.008) - (0.008) - (0.007) - (0.007) - 
Country FE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No 
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.656 - 0.689 - 0.542 - 0.551 - 0.557 - 0.536 - 
C (difference-in-
Sargan) 
0.067 - 0.154 - 0.636 - 0.023 - 0.011 - 0.095 - 
Robust F 757.734 - 633.660 - - - - - - - - - 
Hansen's J 0.000 - 0.004 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
Observations 15,194 15,194 11,516 11,516 11,370 11,370 11,370 11,370 11,370 11,370 11,370 11,370 
Number of banks 2,513 2,513 2,477 2,477 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440 2,440 
 
 
 
